OUR DAYS
This day...in 1986 the people see the salvation of the Lord -
Struggle Against Evil
When the day began, just after midnight, a meeting was in progress in the home of Marcos's Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.
DASMARIŅAS VILLAGE, MAKATI - Among those present were Enrile, his press secretary, Silvestre Afable, and three key officers plotting a coup against Ferdinand Marcos.
The five were putting final touches to a speech Enrile planned to read 36 hours later over national radio and television. Enrile would proclaim himself head of a ruling junta, the National Reconciliation Council, just after rebel troops assaulted the Palace at 2:00 AM February 23, capturing or killing Marcos.
Spearheading the attack on Marcos was Enrile's chief of security, Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, an officer whose relationship with the Defense Minister has been described as "closer than father and son."
Enrile was the central political figure behind the coup conspiracy, but Honasan, his PMA classmates Col. Eduardo Kapunan and Col. Victor Batac, were the masterminds of the attack plans.
At 2:00 AM of the 23rd of February, Sunday, Col. Honasan and his commandos, guided by carefully prepared maps and rebels in the Palace guard, would break into the presidential bedrooms of Malacaņang Palace to arrest Marcos and his First Lady, Imelda. Simultaneously, Col. Kapunan's force would set off a series of massive explosions near the Malacaņang armories, signalling three rebel battalions to move in with reinforcements. The first and largest explosion was intended to assassinate General Fabian Ver who would be sleeping inside his home in nearby Malacaņang Park.
The rebels also finalized a list of nominees for Enrile's junta: opposition candidate Corazon Aquino, Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos, Cardinal Jaime Sin, and several leading technocrats like Marcos's Prime Minister Cesar Virata. Veritas Special Edition Oct 86
Unknown to Honasan, one of his moles in Malacanang Palace had been leaking top-secret details of the coup plot to the Vers.
In January, Honasan had pressured an officer on the staff of the Presidential Security command into acting as an agent within the Palace. Thirty-five-year-old Major Edgardo Doromal had been reluctant to take the assignment, and he wasn't up to its demands. In just a few days, Doromal's nerves frayed, and he unburdened himself to his commander, Col. Irwin Ver, who immediately passed on the astonishing information to his father, the general. The Vers turned the jittery Doromal into a double agent, and he channeled accurate, up-to-date information to them. (WORTH DYING FOR 1987,pp272-273)
While Enrile was polishing his speech, General Ver was fortifying the palace.
MALACAŅANG PALACE, 2:00 AM - Ver ordered the 5th Marine Battalion Landing Team out of Zamboanga to the National Capital Region. He plucked 8 officers and 82 enlisted personnel from the 5th Infantry Battalion in Piddig, Ilocos Norte for urgent posting in Malacaņang. Further, he beefed up the anti-riot units with one Philippine Air Force (PAF) Crowd Dispersal and Control Battalion
Malacaņang's defenses were divided into 4 sectors; each sector had a battalion of ground troops. The Palace was the responsibility of Col. Irwin Ver, Presidential Security Command (PSC) Chief of Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Rexor Ver headed the Presidential Security Unit of 400 men, whose primary mission was to provide close-in security to the First Family. The Recon Company of the PSC, an armored unit with 8 light Scorpion tanks, 10 M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), and 11 V-150s was under Major Wyrlo Ver.
The Pasig River from its mouth at Manila Bay to Guadalupe, about 2 kilometers from the Palace, was secured by a Philippine Navy unit composed of 6 patrol crafts, 2 frigates, a demolition team, and ferry boats. All approaches to the Palace by road were secured by the Metrocom Western Sector under Lt. Col. Agapito Heredia. This mobile unit of 350 men took care of choke points at the Ayala-Lozano approach, the Sta. Mesa-JP Laurel approach, the Mendiola approach, and all approaches on Otis St. and Nagtahan Bridge. The unit was also assigned to provide the palace with in-depth defense.
All in all they had 3,629 fully armed officers and men. (BREAKAWAY1986, pp. 5-6)Acting on orders from Marcos, who was in command, Ver announced to his generals that he would let Col. Honasan's commandos approach the palace riverfront in their rubber boats.
Ver was turning the palace into a death trap. A navy demolition team was already weaving a cat's cradle of detonation leads to 500 lb. bombs and Claymore anti-personnel mines lining the river.
In a garishly theatrical touch, the river was to be lit up with spotlights as Honasan and his men crossed in their boats. Marcos's son, Ferdinand "Bongbong" Jr., was to step forward with a megaphone, give the rebels one chance to surrender, and then signal the launch of the counter-attack. Veritas SpeciaL Oct 86
MALACAŅANG PALACE, High Noon - Stephen Bosworth, American
ambassador to the Philippines since May 4, 1984, was ushered
into the Study Room. With him was Philip Habib, Ronald
Reagan's "trouble shooter," whose presence in the country
was the culmination of several months' turmoil and intrigue.
MALACAŅANG p. 4
Philip Habib was cutting short his stay by three days and
leaving immediately. It would not do for President Reagan's
negotiator to be in Manila if all hell was going to break
loose. It might seem as if he was involved, or responsible.
THE MARCOS DYNASTY 1988, p. 411 The President, Habib, and Bosworth reviewed the elections, discussing peace and order. The Americans brought up the touchy subject of overstaying generals and insisted that Ver resign or retire. They bore down on that so hard that the President said later that perhaps if he had thrown them Ver's head, the Americans might have eased up on him. MALACANANG p. 32
DASMARIŅAS VILLAGE, MAKATI - Enrile was taking lunch with his wife Cristina when Honasan and Kapunan arrived and asked to have a chat with him. Sunday Inquirer Magazine 9 Mar 86
Honasan said, "We're getting constant information that there's an order to round up all the members of the movement." Asiaweek 9 Mar 86
Enrile assessed the situation. "We can disperse, in which case they would hunt each one of us. Or we can regroup and take a stand and take our chances. If we regroup, the possibility of an encounter is very high. But the possibility of a stand-off is not far-fetched." Sun Inq Mag 9 Mar 86
Honasan and Kapunan tried to convince Enrile to fly to Cagayan where he could hide in the meantime and think of other options should the reformists be arrested. They assured him they could handle the situation in the camp. Enrile replied, "Why Cagayan? If I die, I might as well die here." Enrile decided to regroup and call everyone to Camp Aguinaldo. Business Day 28 Feb 86
Cory was receiving a warm welcome from the people of Cebu.
CEBU CITY - People lined the highway leading to the city. In some intersections, crowds became so excited that they literally blocked the road, thus creating momentary bottlenecks in the traffic flow. People shouted "Cory! Cory! Cory!" and "Laban!" There was an abundance of yellow banners, streamers, and flags. People along the motorcade route displayed anything yellow, such as yellow banana leaves, yellow flowers, yellow bedsheets, yellow towels, yellow shirts and blouses, and even yellow men's briefs. PEOPLE POWER (I) 1986, p. 146
Fidel Ramos: I had two important meetings scheduled that day. Lunch with Max Soliven at the house of Mrs. Betty Go Belmonte, and later in the afternoon, a dialogue with Cory supporters, mostly neighbors of mine who wanted to picket my house in Alabang.
Ming Ramos: But I asked them, "What will you get from picketing? You will not get any answers. Why don't you have a dialogue with my husband instead?"
QUEZON CITY - Max Soliven secretly met with Gen. Fidel V. Ramos. Ramos explained why he had not chosen to resign despite the humiliations heaped on him by Mr. Marcos and rogue elements of his Philippine Constabulary who were involved in carnaps, murder, and other crimes. He said he had been helpless to discipline these men as they were protected "from above". He said he had had to swallow his pride because he was needed "in place" to protect the lives of many "reformist" officers and men who would be in danger. Inquirer 25 Feb
MALACAŅANG PALACE, 12:45 PM - Still meeting with US envoy Philip Habib, Mr. Marcos stressed that although he had promised a policy of "maximum tolerance" towards the planned mass protest actions by the opposition and other anti-government forces, "the moment the opposition touched any of the public officials or started a Welga ng Bayan," he would be constrained to take "more forceful measures." Inquirer 23 Feb
While the president was busy with Habib and Bosworth
upstairs, Capt. Ricardo Morales (one of the First Lady's
several escorts and security officers, who was to guide the
rebel force up the stairs into the president's bedroom)
reconnoitered the Palace defenses and then attempted to
withdraw firearms from the Presidential Security Unit
armory. He was accosted and brought to the aides-de-camp
room for questioning. MALACAŅANG
p. 40 While Habib and Marcos had been closeted in the president's study, a noticeably nervous General Ver had been cooling his heels next door in the music room.
Habib had barely been ushered out the front door of Marcos's study when Ver slipped in through a side door to give him urgent news. His men were in the process of grilling four officers...plotters of a plan to storm the palace and oust Marcos. IMPOSSIBLE DREAM 1989, p. 376
MALACAŅANG PALACE - After Habib left, the President headed for his bedroom and rested, a by now predictable turn; he would rest after a caller, or even betweeen calls. His illness demanded that. It was to his bedroom that the news of the Enrile-Ramos mutiny was brought. MALACAŅANG p. 91
US EMBASSY, Just Before 2:00 PM - As he prepared to depart, Habib concluded: "Cory won the election and deserves our support. Marcos is finished, and we ought to offer him asylum in the United States."
Before boarding his US Air Force plane for the flight home, Habib intuitively told an American embassy officer to tell Bosworth, "Something's going to break." IN OUR IMAGE 1989, p. 415
DASMARIŅAS VILLAGE, MAKATI - Enrile's and RAM's number-one priority was to drum up as much public support as they could. To do this, they had to scuttle any impression that they had been planning a coup d'etat.
If people realized that Enrile had been planning to stage a coup and then impose a junta, most of them certainly would not have been supportive. Enrile and his men had to cover their plans and portray themselves as victims.
That settled, Enrile went to his bedroom, changed into jeans and canvas shoes, and took an Uzi submachine gun out of the closet. WORTH DYING FOR p. 276
Before leaving home Enrile contacted Gen. Ramos. "Eddie, I have this problem and I'd like to know if you'll help." He outlined the plot that he had uncovered against RAM. "Will you support us?" QUARTET p. 15
Fidel Ramos: I said at once, "Yes, sir, I'm with you, all the way." Then I warned him that his phone might be bugged. "I know all about it," I said. "I will join you in Camp Aguinaldo." I had wanted my withdrawal to have a very profound impact on events. I had been waiting for the right moment. And it came.
RAM recognized that while a significant number of officers and men were prepared to line up behind Enrile, his long political and personal association with Marcos had tainted him in the minds of many more. And this was doubly true among the civilian power structure, the wealthy businessmen who'd emerged as an anti-Marcos force and the large middle class who'd tirelessly marched and demonstrated ever sine the Aquino assassination. Ramos's image was much cleaner. WORTH DYING FOR p. 265 CEBU CITY - Cory campaigned for civil disobedience. "We are ready to assume office as soon as Mr. Marcos goes," she said. Malaya 23 Feb 86
She expanded the list of firms and establishments she had asked the people to boycott. In the new list were Fortune Tobacco, Asia Brewery, Allied Bank, Rustan's Cebu, Cebu Plaza Hotel, Cebu Casino, Cebu Jai Alai, and the government-run station DYFM. The Sunday Times 23 Feb 86
CAMP AGUINALDO, 3:30 PM - On arrival at his office in the Defense Ministry, Enrile had his guards break out brand-new M-16 Armalites, still wrapped in plastic, and an arsenal of mortars and Israel-made Uzis and Galils. Asiaweek 9 Mar
He ordered Honasan to deploy the fully-armed troops not only around Camp Aguinaldo but also around Camp Crame, headquarters of the Constabulary and the National Police, forces sympathetic to RAM. Enrile began with 200 troops. QUARTET p. 17
He made a series of calls. He called up US Ambassador Stephen Bosworth and Ambassador Kiyoshi Somiya of Japan to inform them that "we are now grouped in this building because there is an order to round us all up." The ambassadors indicated that they would inform their respective governments about it. Sun Inq Mag 9 Mar 86
He called back home, instructed his wife to contact Mrs. Eggie Apostol of the Philippine Daily Inquirer "to tell her what's happening and to ask her to please contact other members of media about it." He contacted by long-distance telephone Rafael Salas, UN population czar, in New York "to say goodbye." Also he called Cardinal Sin. QUARTET p. 17
ARCHBISHOP'S PALACE - Jaime Cardinal Sin received a call from Minister Enrile. "Cardinal, I will be dead within one hour." He seemed to be trembling. "I don't want to die...if it is possible, do something. I'd still like to live." He was almost in tears. PEOPLE POWER (II) P. 105 CAMP AGUINALDO, 4:30 PM - Enrile instructed Col. Honasan to plan and establish the area's defense. "We will fire our first shot only if we are attacked, because I want to maintain dialogue with whoever will be coming to challenge us." Sun Inq Mag 9 Mar SOCIAL HALL, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 6:45 PM - The mood was tense as the two men, clad in olive and gray, and blinking into the glare of television lights, took their seats before a cluster of microphones.
Behind them huddled about a dozen soldiers, some in full battle regalia. Outside, at the gates of the Ministry, heavily armed guards and tanks stood at the ready. When the two men began to speak, the reason for the precautions became startlingly clear, for they proclaimed open rebellion, Philippine style, against the twenty-year regime of President Ferdinand Marcos. Time 3 Mar 86
"We're going to die here fighting," Minister Juan Ponce Enrile declared as he and Gen. Fidel Ramos crossed their bridges, so to speak, and began the revolt against Ferdinand Marcos. Mr & Ms. 28 Feb
ENRILE: The fact is, there is a report that we are going to be arrested. ... As of now, I am still the Minister of National Defense and that is why I came here. ... We have no intention of harming anybody. We are here to take a stand. If anyone of us will be killed, I think...all of us must be killed. We'll stay here until we are all killed.
RAMOS: There has become an elite Armed Forces of the Philippines that no longer represents the rank and officers' corps of the Armed Forces. ... The President of 1986 is not the President to whom we dedicated our service. it is clear that he no longer is the able and capable commander-in-chief that we count upon. ... He has put his personal family interest above the interest of the people. We do not consider President Marcos as now being a duly constituted authority.
ENRILE: I cannot in my conscience recognize the President as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and I am appealing to the other members of the Cabinet to heed the will of the people expressed during the last elections. Because in my own region, I know that we cheated in the elections to the extent of 350,000 votes. ... No, I will not serve under Mrs. Aquino even if she is installed as a president. ... Our loyalty is to the Constitution and the country. ... You are welcome to join us. We have no food...
RAMOS: I am not even acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. I think that when he made that announcement to you and to the whole world last Sunday, he was just fooling us, and he was fooling the entire world because he flip-flopped so many times already. ... I would like to appeal to the fair and to the dedicated and people-oriented members of the AFP and the INP to join us in this crusade for better government. Malaya 23 Feb 86
Jose Almonte: After the presscon, General Ramos and Minister Enrile met to review the situation. General Ramos decided to go back to Crame because he was the PC Chief, his staff was there, his communications set-up was there.
Fidel Ramos: The division of powers between Minister Enrile and myself was clear. He would take care of the political and diplomatic affairs, I would command the military operation. RADIO VERITAS, 9:00 PM - Jaime Cardinal Sin went on Radio Veritas asking the people to support "our two good friends." BAYAN KO! 1986 p. 129
TEODORO BENIGNO "Leave your homes now," the Cardinal said, "I ask you to support Mr. Enrile and Gen. Ramos, give them food if you like, they are our friends." Manila Times 13 Mar
Not long after, food came in, including sacks of rice and canned goods. Sunday Times 23 Feb
PASAY CITY - Butz Aquino was at a birthday party. The news was that the opposition leaders were going to be picked up, martial law was going to be declared. Over the radio they heard the replay of the Ramos-Enrile press conference. At hearing the appeal of General Ramos and Minister Enrile, Butz concluded that the situation was serious. He continued listening, and eating. Sun Inq Mag 1 Jun
LUIS D. BELTRAN - The whole town is buzzing with rumors that the independent press offices have been or will be raided. Palace and military sources say that there is such a plan for this evening. The plan is to arrest four Cabinet Ministers and close down three newspapers: Veritas, Malaya, and Inquirer. Inquirer 24 Feb
MAKATI, 9:30 PM - After some discussion the ATOM (August Twenty-One Movement) Executive Committee decided to wait for further developments and for instructions from Cory in Cebu.
Butz disagreed with the majority decision to wait and see rather than go all out in support of Ramos and Enrile. "This is our chance to split the military," he said. He thought it was "out of character" for Ramos to be "included in a zarzuela to fool the people." As for Enrile, Butz was willing to take a chance on him: "I don't know him well but I am convinced that he had nothing to do with the assassination of Ninoy. When it comes to human rights violations, we can't pinpoint anything on him directly. We also know he's been powerless for the last several years. It's Gen. Ver who's been calling the shots."
On his own Butz decided to take the daring course of action. He called MP Palma and asked her, "Do you believe in these two guys?" And she said, "I think so. What are your plans?" Butz told her, "I'm going to Camp Aguinaldo and offer our support, whatever support we can give them." Ibid.
CAMP AGUINALDO, Also Around 10:00 PM - Enrile talked by phone with Corazon Aquino in Cebu where she had just finished speaking before some 50,000 people at Fuente Osmena, the third in a series of nationwide rallies she had promised if cheated out of the Presidency. Asiaweek 9 Mar
Their dialogue was brief; they both knew the phone was tapped. He warned her that her life was in danger. "They'll probably come to get you. So take the necessary precautions." QUARTET p. 84
Cory Aquino: I asked him how he was and he said they were holding out. I said, well, all I can offer you for this moment are my prayers. And he said, we certainly need your prayers.
CAMP AGUINALDO, 10:20 PM - Butz sought out Enrile. He could
feel the tension in the air. The soldiers on the stairway
were sweating.
PEOPLE POWER (I) p. 105 Enrile was "tense, perspiring, perhaps from the heat of his bullet-proof vest." At Butz's offer of support, Enrile answered, "We need all the support we can get."
Spying Jun Tana of Radio Veritas on the phone, Butz plugged in and made his call to the people: "I am here at Camp Aguinaldo. I have just spoken to Minister Enrile. He and his men are bracing themselves against an attack. We are here to try and prevent bloodshed. We are going to work for a peaceful solution... I am calling on all concerned citizens, specially my friends in ATOM, BANDILA, and FSDM to meet me at Isetann in Cubao. There we will decide on the best course of action." Sun Inq Mag 1 Jun
MALACANANG PALACE, 10:30 PM - President Marcos went on television, live from the Palace. He said he was "in control of the situation." He called on Enrile and Ramos "to stop this stupidity and surrender so that we may negotiate."
He reported thwarting an attempt on his life by a bodyguard of the First Lady in a conspiracy involving Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos, Armed Forces Vice Chief of Staff. He presented the alleged assassin, Army Capt. Ricardo Morales, who read his supposed confession from a piece of folded paper produced from his pocket.
Mr. Marcos said he was in touch with his commanders and he had instructed them to surround Camp Aguinaldo. If Enrile and Ramos refused to surrender, his troops from the Palace grounds "could annihilate them with heavy artillery and tanks" without any from his command suffering any casualty. The Sunday Times 23 Feb
RADIO VERITAS - Enrile was interviewed by Harry Gasser. Enrile's message to Marcos: "Mr. President, I hope you're listening. Enough is enough, Mr. President. Your time is up." He warns, "Do not miscalculate our strength now.
Enrile dismissed the possibility of negotiations with Marcos, citing the lateness of the hour. He denied the existence of a plot to assassinate the President. "There is no official named Morales in the AFP." Sunday Times 23 Feb ISETANN, CUBAO - "Everybody came armed to the teeth," said Butz. "A lot of guys brought out their arms-their `hidden arms'-with them."
By midnight the number of people had swelled to close to 10,000. As they marched to Camp Aguinaldo chanting "Cory! Cory!" and proudly flashing the Laban sign, more people came converging, and by the time they got to the camp, their numbers had risen to 20,000 or 30,000. They were bolder now, more confident. Sun Inq Mag 1 Jun
Cory Aquino: At the time Marcos still loomed as someone so formidable but I was thinking that maybe this is it, you know, the end of everything. So we prayed, of course, at the Carmelite monastery. and I surrendered everything to the Lord.
Fidel Ramos: Saturday night it was very clear to me that there was going to be a stand-off. How long this would last, nobody knew. I only knew that it was important to use the only weapon we had available at the time, and that was the people interposing themselves between us and the hostile forces of Marcos and Ver. We used the very weapon that Cory Aquino used during and after the snap elections.
Jose Almonte: One of my principal assignments with Vic Batac concerned people power. We reviewed the many social movements in various countries in various periods, in particular, Ghandi's work and peoples' experiences in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. At one point I told Tingting Cojuangco na ang strategy against the soldiers of Marcos is to climb the tanks, kiss the soldiers, give them flowers.
MALACANANG PALACE, Saturday Night - No attack came because Ferdinand was busy hedging his bets. He ordered a barge towed up the Pasig River in the dark to the palace quay, where it was loaded with three hundred packed crates, most of them extraordinarily heavy. Yamashita's Gold was taking a trip. DYNASTY pp. 415-416
EDSA - The crowd that was expected to dwindle seemed to swell instead. A cautious estimate placed the crowd at close to a hundred thousand. One reason for the eager turn-out: it was such a beautiful night. The moon almost full made the ambience so lucid some people claimed they could read by its light. The air so crisp and brisk it was a delight to be out of doors.
Nobody was being pompous or heroic about this camp-out on ground threatened with bombardment. The priests and the nuns and the pious were here from obedience; the other adults were simply anti-Marcos; for most of the young, all this was just a lark. QUARTET p. 27
From : Angela Stuart-Santiago, EDSA 1986, www.stuartxchange.org
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